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63RURAL LABOR POLICIES IN THE AGRICULTURAL DEV13LOPMENT
STRATEGIES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Jo Ann Paulson
Overview o! Chinese Employment Polici!~
The redundant agricultural labor found in the rural areas of many
developing countries has been viewed alternatively as the potential tool
for producing an agricultural surplus and spurring economic growth or as
the politically explosive and virtually unsolvable employment problem of
the future. The unemployment problem in rural areas manifests itself in
low average productivity and income per capita in the agricultural sector
and uncontrolled migration from rural to urban areas. The lure of economic
opportunities, social amenities, and educational advantages of the urban
areas have turned out to be mirages to the rural migrants who must fre-
quently be content with low-paying jobs in the service sector for the
educated and subsistence level stree~ jobs for the uneducated. The indus-
trial sector does not seem to hold the promise of quiclcrelief since it
has typically been unable to absorb even the increases in the indigenous
urban labor force. Because migration to the cities and industrial centers
may not be a viable alternative, policy makers are being forced to reexamine
the role agriculture can play in dealing with rural employment problems.
The planners in the People’s Republic of China have taken a fairly
unique approach to labor policy--unique because :laborpolicy has been well
integrated with other components of the development strategy. This standsin sharp contrast to the piecemeal approach characterized by short-term
isolated projects common in other developing countries. In China, labor
policy has been one of the most important keys to development with labor
substituted for scarce resources, e.g. land and capital. This paper will
attempt to show how the Chinese have used labor policy to deal with the
problems of rural unemployment and further the development process.
The traditional Chinese agrarian sector was characterized by a low
land/man ratio, low productivity of labor with higher productivity of land,
and great seasonal fluctuations in the demand for labor with a shortage
during planting and harvesting periods and virtual unemployment during the





this situation were the limited amount of arable
of land holdings, and the feudal organization of
Party gained control of the Chinese Mainland in
1949 they were confronted with the double challenge of increasing agricul-
tural productivity and either utilizing or supporting a huge supply of
rural labor. Increasing agricultural productivity was given high priority
because an agricultural surplus was considered a necessary first step in
transforming a primarily agricultural country into an industrial power.
An agricultural surplus was needed to provide raw materials and fibers for
industry and to accumulate savings which could be channeled into industry.
A surplus was also needed to support the rapidly growing urban population.
“The absolute number of city dwellers increased
the end of 1956 by over 30 million people or 55
p. 208).
between early 1950 and
percent” (Perkins, 1964,In the early stages of development, Chinese planners relied heavily
on the Russian model, which meant collecting the agricultural surplus to
finance a rapid industrializationprogram. But the Chinese were not able.
to adopt the Russian model without modification because of the precarious
food situation in China. The Russians had been able to extract the agricul-
tural surplus from the countryside to be channeled into industrialization
without risking widespread starvation. Chinese agriculture was not produc-
tive enough to supply a surplus without first increasing output. So while
the Russians had used compulsory delivery quotas of agricultural goods to
finance industrialization, the Chinese first had to increase agricultural
output and then attempt to raise the portion available to the government.
The Communist leadership developed the basis for an agrarian policy
during their retreat to Yenan, from 1936 until the end of World War 11.
During this period the leadership, especially Mao Tse-tung, reportedly
reached the conclusion that manpower was one of the most valuable resources
in China because of the scarcity of land and capitialand that there was
not an overpopulation problem. This conclusion was understandable given
the labor shortage that plagued the Communists during the Yenan Period
with the labor demands of fighting the Japanese and Nationalists, maintain-
ing agricultural output, educating new recruits, and establishing a new
regional government, Given the conclusion that China should rely on
manpower as a key to development and that if labor were fully utilized
China would not have a labor surplus, the leadership saw social reorgani-
zation as a necessary prerequisite for effective labor policies.
Karacher argues that the labor pelf.cydeveloped by the Communists
during the Yenan Period had two main thrusts. The first was to increaselabor force participation rates. The second was to improve the efficiency
of labor. (Karacher, 1975, p. 31.) In addition there have been two other
themes in Chinese labor policy since 1949. The Communists have pushed to
increase the utilization of the labor force and also to improve the incen–
tives offered to the labor force.
Attempts to increase labor force participation rates were largely
dependent on institutional changes. The rural sector was reorganized to
collectivize land holdings, tools, and labor obligations. It was believed
that a collective system would lead to greater participation by formerly
underemployed labor. Another aspect of the campaign for increased labor
force participation attempted to draw upon segments of the population which
have traditionally been exempt from manual agricultural labor. Targets for
this program were women, bureaucrats (both urban and rural), Communist
cadres, army personnel, students, managers, and the “educated elites.”
The first attempt to incorporate these elements into the agricultural labor
force was based on the gradual reorganization of the countryside into
communes. Day care centers and communal dining halls freed women for field
work. The retreat from the commune system in 1961 did not change the
emphasis on fuller utilization of womanpower in the agricultural sector.
This trend has been reinforced in the last year (1975) with more generous
work point scales for women~ youth> and the older population.
Various campaigns have been launched to reduce the distinctions
between manual agricultural labor and more prestigiousand better paid
“elitist” jobs. The motivations for these campaigns were partly the need
to increase the available labor force during the peak seasons and partly
the political desire to downplay social class distinctions. The “hsia-fang”movement has been used to send students, bureaucrats, and factory laborers
from urban areas to the countryside for periods ranging from a few weeks
to permanent reassignment. Even the “educated elite” are not exempt.from
required periods of agricultural labor.
Attempts to increase labor force utilization have also been
tied to the reorganization efforts. The move to larger units of
closely
production
and planning made large-scale public works projects feasible. This helped
to absorb the seasonally unemployed agricultural labor. Also the commune
system increased the demand for managers, planners, educators, bureaucrats)
health personnel, and laborers in subsidiary activities.
Mass mobilization campaigns have been a major tool in implementing
the program of greater utilization.
of long-range economic and political
public works projects. (The purpose
These campaigns have used a mixture
incentives to rally support for
of these campaigns is to utilize
seasonally underemployed agricultural laborers to improve the irrigation
and transportation systems, reclaim land, build rural industries, etc.)
The projects have usually been organized on a commune or multi-commune
level and have therefore
ization.
Attempts to improve
benefited from the move to larger units of organ-
incentives for the labor force have fluctuated
between economic and political incentives. For most of the period since
1949, economic incentives have been used to gradually improve the standard
of living in the countryside. The majority of income is distributed as
reimbursement for earned work points. Even the older population and
children over the age of six are expected to accumulate a few work points
in collective labor, i.e. everyone who is “able” is expected to “earn”6
a living. Many households also have private income either from the culti-
vation of private plots or from raising livestock or other subsidiary
activities.
The central government has manipulated several policies to improve
incentives for the rural sector. The terms of trade have been maintained
in favor of the agricultural sector. The tax on agricultural output is
designed to allow farmers to reap the benefits of increased productivity.
The tax is raised only every 5 to 7 years so that in the short run, farmers
retain the benefits of increased productivity. Also, the central govern-
ment has relied on grain imports since the early 1970’s to feed North
China. The end result of this policy is that the production quotas for
farmers in other regions have not been increased in years of agricultural
failure and more grain is left for distribution to commune members as
income.
Increasing labor efficiency also relied on collectivization and rural
reorganization. (It would be misleading to state this goal as only increas-
ing labor efficiency; it is more accurate to say that the strategy is to
increase labor efficiency and land productivity.) During the first decade
of Communist government the main emphasis was on better utilization of tra-
ditional inputs to increase agricultural output. The Communists assumed
that there were economies of scale for larger units of production, i.e.
the communes, and that the seasonal public works projects sponsored on the
commune level would increase productivity for both labor and land by improv-
ing irrigation systems, developing better water control, land reclamation,
and the development of other infrastructure. After 1961, the Chinese
leadership concluded that China was reaching the limits on production thatcould be achieved by relying exclusively on traditional inputs. This
prompted a change in emphasis from reorganization to modernization of the
agricultural sector with technical change. Many of the new policies such
as selective mechanization and the use of multiple cropping patterns,
chemical inputs$ and new seeds will have a profound impact on the amount
and nature of the labor demanded. The shift to a more sophisticated tech-
nology requires better rural education and agricultural research systems.
The modernization of the agricultural sector will therefore have long-run
implications for both the quantity and quality of rural labor demanded.
Parameters of the Employment Problem
Data Limitations
Before expanding the preceding comments on Chinese labor policies,
the limitations of this research must be outlined. There are three basic
constraints that will be particularly important in limiting the scope of
this paper: the lack of reliable data on China, the paucity of information
on the political and economic planning processes in China, and the incon-
sistent use of economic terus in the Chinese literature.
There has been a long and stormy controversy in the ranks of “China
watchers” over the validity of the official Communist Chinese statistics,
especially in the areas of population employment agricultural and indus-
trial production, and econom:Lcgrowth rates. There has been an equally
heated controversy over the Western, particularly American, attempts to
quantify these same variables for China.
Liu and Yeh have argued that the statistical data gathered before
1957 are unreliable because of the inadequate size, experience, and collec-
tion techniques of the statistical bureaucracy. This may have beenespecially true in the agricultural sector since there was a tendency to
underreport production during the early years of the People’s Republic.
But it was for this period (1949-1957) that Western scholars had access
to aggregate economic data which have been used to judge more recent
statistics released by the Chinese. The period during the Great Leap
Forward (1958-1961)was characterized by over-enthusiastic estimates gener-
ated to fit the expectations of Peking. After this fiasco Peking halted
the release of all aggregate economic data in 1960. This means ~hat
national and provincial data on budgetary revenues, expenditures, popula–
tion, and agricultural output are not available in any systematic way,
Since that time “China watchers” have had to be content with pulling iso-
lated statistics from newspaper articles and radio reports. Now data on
even the most basic aspects of che Chinese economic system are not avail-
able, are unreliable, or are incomplete. Although in some cases the lack.
of data can be attributed to the Chinese obsession with secrecyj in most
cases it is clear that the Chinese simply do not have the data.
Although this lack of statistical information on China is definitely
a handicap when attempting to do research on the agricultural sector~ the
problem may not be as severe as it first appears. First, there are many
scholars working on this problem and developing estimates on relevant
economic variables so that even though precise figures are not available,
broad estimates and trends are. Second, the data problem for China is not
that different from what is found in most underdeveloped countries; either
the data are not collected or not made public. Third, the clecislon-making
process has been largely decentralized in China in the last decade. There-
fore a general discussion of employment policies may be more helpful than9
specific examples of isolated programs bacause of the wide variation in
local conditions.
The second limitation mentioned was the paucity of information on
the political and planning processes in China. Information has been
selectively released by the Chinese government but knowledge of the work-
ings of the government remain largely a matter of speculation. It is
possible to say that economic decision-making has been decentralized but
it is not possible to say exactly how the national and local levels inter-
act in establishing plans, setting agricultural quotas, and instigating
large scale-public works programs.
Another problem inherent in doing research on China is the inconsis-
tency of the Chinese economic jargon. Not only are economic terms used
differently than usage in other socialist countries, but there is also
inconsistency in the usage of terms among various writers and publications.
These data limitations make it impossible to discuss labor policy
in terms of specific projects, goals, objectives, or program evaluations.
Therefore the aim of this paper will be to discuss labor policy only on
the macro level with more emphasis on trends than on micro results. Also
this paper will attempt to show how labor policy fits Into the broader
Chinese development plan; i.e. the possible interaction between employ-
ment policy and technical change, etc.
The following sections will give a broad overview of the demographic
and geographic characteristics of the Chinese agricultural sector.
Land Characteristics and Use
Although the total land mass of the People’s Republic of China is
slightly larger than the continental United States (973 million hectares10
and 768 million hectares respectively), much of the land area of China
is unsuited for agriculture. The arable land available in China :ls
estimated to be only two-thirds that of the United States. The comparison
improves somewhat if sown land is considered instead of arable land because
the Chinese rely heavily on double or triple cropping techniques in areas
where the climate is favorable for agriculture. “Consequently, the sown
area in the PeopleVs Republic of China was estimated in 1964 to be 150 mil-
lion hectares, compared to a &own area of 116 million hectares in the “U.S.}
where much arable land was idle because of production or area restrictions.
Were this comparison made.for 1974 when much of the idle land in the {J.$.
had been returned co production, the figures for sown land would probably
be 155 million hectares in the PRC and 136 million in the U.S.” (American
Plant Studies Delegation, 1975, p. 19.) Deleyne estimated there are 1,400
to 1,600 square meters of cultivated surface per iliha’b~.~:allt----the Uncertai,nhy
being due to the imprecise population estimate-- and 1,$800square metiersIJer
person in the countryside. (Deleyme, 1973, p. 63.) The pro”blemof land
shortage is aggravated by wide differences in population density. “The
mountainous and arid Northwest comprising 42 percxwtiof the I,ancl area
accounts for 4 percent of the population; while 96 percent of the popd.a-
tion, some 750 million people, are crowded into the southeast:region which
is only 8 times as large as ‘Texas,” (Wei, 1974, p. 21.5-216.)
Population
The Chinese government does not release and evidently doe~ not know
the exact size of c“hepopulation :Lnthe People’s Republic of China. A good
example of the uncertainty concerning population estimates was the statement
made in 1971 by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien911
We have been racing against time to cope with the enormous
increases in population. Some people estimate the population
at 800 million and some at 750 million. Unfortunately, there
are no accurate statistics in this connection. Nevertheless,
the officials at the supply and grain department are saying
confidently, “The number is 800 million people.” Officials
outside the grain department say the population is 750 million
only” while the Ministry of Commerce affirms that the “number
is 830 million.” However, the Planning Department insists
that the number is “less than 750 million”. The Ministry of
Commerce insists on the bigger number in order to be able to
provide goods in larger quantities. The planning men reduce the
figure in order to strike a balance in the plans of the various
state departments. (Ashbrook, 1975, p. 35.)
The official Census conducted in 1953 set the total population of the
country at 582 million. This was the only wide-scale attempt to conduct
a census and has been widely criticized as unreliable.
Understandably the same kind of uncertainty extends to estimates of
rates of population growth. The estimates offered usually fall in a range
from 1.9 to 2.2 percent and Chinese publications frequently give the growth
rate as “approximately 2 percent.” This is a significant decrease from
the 3.7 percent birth rate found from a 5 percent population sample taken
at the time of the 1953 Census. (Hou, 1968, p. 333.)
It is even more difficult to assess how successful birth control
programs have been in the rural areas. It can be safely assumed from the
accounts of foreign visitors that the reorganization of the rural social
structure has not ended the preference for large families. Because reim-
bursement to the household is on the basis of work points accumulated,
able-bodied male children are still considered the best form of social
security for parents. All accounts agree that the birth rate is higher
in rural than urban areas.12
The Labor Force
There has been a substantial increase in the labor pool available to
both industry and agriculture since the late 1960’s which promises to
strain the existing employment policies during this decade.
The working population has been increasing since 1963 by over
2 percent a year. It can be estimated that, from 1968 on, the
age groups reaching working age will be from 20 million to 25
million. The age groups who can opt for retirement will be
much less numerous, so that from 10 to 15 million new jobs will
have to be created every year for young men and women if they are
not to be underemployed in the country. But, according to
plausible estimates, the number of new urban jobs does not exceed
500,000 a year. From 1980, on the contrary, there will be a dip
in the numbers of new recruits to the Iabour market, reflecting
the drop in the birth rate and the increase in infantile mortal-





80 and 85 percent of the total population of China lives in
This includes workers engaged in rural industries, education,
commerce, and other non-agricultural pursuits as well as the agricultural
work force. Estimates of the percentage of the population engaged in the
agricultural sector range from 70 to 85 percent depending on the definition
of agriculture used. The official.Communist data available are very sketchy.
In the post-1949 period the Chinese government has defined agricultural
population as the population supported primarily from agricultural income.
This definition covers full-time farmers~ part-time farmers who engage in
subsidiary occupations and those who engage only in subsidiary occupations
directly related to agriculture such as those involved in the preliminary
processing of agricultural products. Using this definition, the pre-1949
estimate of the percent of population in agriculture was 73 percent. The
official post-1949 estimate given by Peking is that from 73 to 77 percent13
of the total population is engaged in agriculture. (Liuand Yeh, 1965,
p. 183.) This corresponds closely to the estimates derived by Liu and
Yeh for the period 1949 to 1956. (Liu and Yeh, 1965, p. 184.) This meant
that the agricultural population ranged in size from 532 to 468 million
persons for 1956 depending on the population estimate used. (Liu and
Yeh, 1965, p. 184.) The official statistics released in 1957 showed a
somewhat smaller percentage engaged in agriculture, 72 percent of the total
population. This may be due to the employment fluctuations during the
Great Leap Forward. At the same time the Chinese government listed 16 to
17 percent of the population in the secondary sector and 11 to 12 percent
in the tertiary sector. (Deleyne, 1973, p. 61.) It seems reasonable to
assume that in the period since the Great Leap Forward the employment dis-
tribution has returned to former patterns and that approximately 73 to 77
percent of the total population is engaged in agriculturally related
employment.
Rural Unemployment Rates
The Chinese, unlike some other Communist countries, have conceded
that urban unemployment exists and have occasionally even given estimates
of the magnitude. (Hou, 1968, p. 372.) But rural unemployment data are
nonexistent, and to work with the available estimates one must be willing
to accept a large margin of error. There is rarely a clear distinction
between employed and unemployed in the rural sector and the question
usually beaomes one of measuring the intensity of employment.
Most of the information on the employment situation in pre-Communist
China comes from the work done by John Lossing Buck in the early 1930’s.14
The following figures from that study give a rough idea of the employment
picture in traditionalChina.
Some 45 percent of the rural males and 9 percent of the rural
females over seven years of age were found by Buck to engage
exclusively in agricultural occupations of all kinds, while
another 27 percent of the men and 20 percent of the women sup-
plemented agriculture with other work. Non-agricultural tasks
(includinghousehold duties) were the sole occupation of 20
percent of males and 59 percent of females, while only 7 percent
and 11 percent of each sex respectively were idle throughout the
year. Men were responsible for 80 percent of all farm labour,
women for 13 percent, and children for 7 percent. Two man-
equivalent labour units were employed on average per farm, of
which family labour accounted for 1.7 units and hired labour for
only 0.3 percent of a unit. It is to be expected (although no
study on this point is to hand) that women’s contribution to
agriculture has increased, in numbers working and even more in
effectiveness, since the decline of the cuskom of footbinding,
a decline which was rapid after the 1911 Revolution.
In the winter season, from November to February, agricul-
tural work is slack; time spent at this period accounted, accord-
ing to Buck, for 80 percent of the 1.7 months of idleness aver-
aged by ablebodled men of working age.
Shortage of labour at the peak seasons of agricultural
activity (harvesting, transplanting of rice and irrigation) was
found by Buck to be widespread. (Donnithorne, 1967, p. 32-33.)
Buck’s work has unfortunately been used extensively to project the
labor requirements of China. The whole organization of the rural sector
has changed drastically since 1949, and projections from this earlier
period are clearly not valid.
In brave attempts to overcome the problems with estimating post-1949
unemployment levels, several authors have offered estimates. Most of these
estimates are for the period before 1957, i.e. before the Great Leap Forward.
Lui and Yeh reported high unemployment rates for nonagricultural laborers
in rural areas. Their estimates ranged from 18 million unemployed non-
agricultural males in rural areas in 1952 to 21 million in 1957. (Liu and
Yeh, 1965, 1965, table 24, p. 102-103.)15
Chi-ming Hou, while stating that the evidence on rural unemployment
was not conclusive for the early Communist period, cited several studies
which reported some “surplus” labor in the rni.d-1950’s.
Farmers spent only two-thirds of their time directly on farms;
and there was a 26 percent surplus of labor in six agricultural
cooperatives in Hopei; 30 percent in 18 agricultural cooperatives
in Shensi; 17 percent in 497 agricultural cooperatives in Ki.angsi;
and 35 percent in 18 agricultural cooperatives in Szechwan (Li
Yuan-then, “The Problem of Surplus Labor in Present-Stage Agri-
culture in Our Country,” Chiao-hsueh yu yen-chien, No. 2, Feb. 4,
1957, p. 17). (Surplus is apparently defined in terms of time
not used on farm work.) According to a larger survey of 26,000
agricultural cooperatives in 1955, a “labor unit” only worked
96 “labor days” a year, with a half of a year’s time being
“unproductive.” It was also reported, however, that for the
“full labor units” idleness was seasonal, whereas there was a
year-round surplus of “half labor” and “subsidiary labor” (Li,
1957, p. 20). (HOU, 1968, p. 378-379.)
Hou stated that regardless of the conclusions reached about rural
disguised unemployment in the stri’ctsense, “there is little doubt that
seasonal unemployment had reached such proportions that
tion of manpower was necessary.” (Hou, 1968, p. 379.)
evidence of underemployment. He cited the results c)fa





was without gainful employment on 17 to 35 percent of all workdays.”
(Emerson, 1968, p. 420.)
Therefore it can be concluded that in the period before the Great
Leap Forward, which began in late 1957, there was significant unemployment
in the rural areas--a great deal of it being the seasonal unemployment
associated with the agricultural cycle.
The policies of the Great Leap Forward will be explained in more detail
in the next section, but it should be noted here that the Great Leap Forward16
had two main goals: to increase agricultural production and to speed
industrial growth. Industry was given priority over agriculture. Labor
was the key input in both sectors since there was an acute scarcity of
capital thus attacking both the problems of economic development and
seasonal unemployment, But in many cases the policies of the Great Leap
Forward were carried to excess. The labor force was overworked and labor
incentives were reduced as the communes moved to distributing necessities
“according to need.” Labor shortages were widely reported as the peasants
were asked to,devote more time to non-agricultural pursuits. (See Hou,
1968, p. 381.)
It is safe to say that during the Great Leap Forward, rural under-
employment was reduced. But the increased participation and utilization
of the labor force which resulted from the GLF policies were tempered by
the unauthorized outflux of rural inhabitants to urban areas and the virtual
work stoppages on some communes. As Hou points out, it is difficult to
evaluate the results of intensive labor utilization. Many other contingent
factors may have contributed to the economic setbacks during the GLF--
making it impossible to sort out the costs and benefits of the more inten-
sive use of labor.
Since 1960 there have been few attempts to estimate the magnitude of
underemployment in rural areas. A report by Dawson suggests that per-unit
labor requirements for staple crop production have increased because of
more intensive cultivation (Dawson, 1970, p. 160). Another summary by
Reynolds reported the same conclusions and stressed the impact of reorganiz-
ing the rural sector which resulted in greater labor demands for non-
agricultural activities (Reynolds, 1975, p. 424).17
It is impossible to try and deal with the post-1960 employment situa-
tion quantitatively. It is only possible to discuss trend and policies
with broad generalizations that will be elaborated on later.
While there is a low land/man rath in china it iS still assumed that
the marginal product of rural labor is greater than zero.
..* There is ample evidence that the marginal product of labor
in China is not yet zero. There are always areas where the land
can be made more level and where the irrigation canals can be lined,
but labor productivity in such activities is very low. The trans-
port of farm products to the markets or railhead also consumes
large amounts of labor when the goods are carried on human backs
or animal-drawn carts. There are also brief periods of peak
labor demand principally when farmers have only a few days or
weeks to harvest one crop and transplant the second. At such
times, the addition of more workers can make a substantial dif-
ference in the amount of grain output eventually achieved.
If, when other factors are held constant, the marginal
product of rural labor is not zero, it is unlikely that it is high
or even above the level necessary to provide the additions to
the rural population with enough to eat. (Perkins, 1975,
p, 354-355.)
Land development, irrigation schemes, and other activities associated
with agricultural infrastructure continue to draw heavily on the rural
labor force. Much of the labor is drawn from seasonally unemployed agri-
cultural workers but the larger projects reduce the amount of rural labor
available for crop cultivation.
(Quote from Vice Premier Tan Cheng-lin, in charge of agriculture)
According to Tan’s estimate, ordinary construction work on the farm
(such as ground leveling, field consolidation, soil improvement,
erosion control, etc. alone) usually occupied about 20 percent of
the total labor units. The percentage would be much higher, if the
extra seasonal work (winter-spring)were included.
Hence the current situation (1960) is that only a little more
than 50 percent of the farm labor units could be devoted to the
task of crop production. (Dawson, 1970, p. 160.)
As the technical transformation and “green revolution” that began18
in China’s agricultural sector in 1964 continues, the quantity and quality
of rural labor demanded will change. In some areas more labor-intensive
methods, such as more intensive cultivation and multiple-cropping methods
are being used. In other areas less labor-intensive techniques, such as
mechanization and electric powered irrigation systems are being used.
While it is impossible to draw conclusions about the net results of these
changes, it can be assumed that the quality of labor will need to change
as the need for better educated and scientifically trained agricultural
laborers increases.
The policies of the central government are meant to promote local
and regional “self-sufficiency” in food. The switch from grain cultivation
to more labor-intensive products-- vegetables, meat, fruit, poultry, etc---
will increase the demand for labor.
The drive for economic diversity is manifested in the rural industrial-
ization schemes. As the communes expand local industries--as well as
public services-- there will be more opportunity for diversified employ-
ment for seasonally underemployed and redundant agricultural labor.
Rural Organization since 1949
Collectivization
The key to Chinese employment policy is in the collective form of
rural organization. The Chinese argue that this system virtually elimin-
ates the concept of unemployment in rural areas and that a collective system
is also more conducive to agricultural development because it makes large-
scale land improvement and irrigation projects possible and prevents a
bimodal pattern of economic development with most of the benefits accruing
to the rich. Collectivization has been important for all four thrusts of19
Chinese employment policy: increasing participation, utilization, pro-
ductivity, and incentives. The present rural organization of China is a
unique system.
This section includes a historical overview of the step-by-step
collectivization process which moved the countryside within a decade from
a disjointed collection of small farmers to a highly centralized system
of communes. Then there will be a discussion of the present state of
rural organization and the changes that have taken place in the last 15
years. Finally, there is a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of collectivization as related to employment policy.
Land Reforms, 1949-1952
When the civil war ended in
a fraction of the prewar level.
perhaps two-thirds of the prewar
China in 1949, agricultural output was
Perkins estimated that “Production was
level and the amount that was marketed
had fallen to 21 percent of the total output from a prewar level estimated
in one source at as high as 53 percent.” (Perkins, 1964, p. 209.) The
end of the fighting and the accompanying reopening of urban-rural trade
channels, repair of the irrigation facilities and dikes, and the price
stability maintained by the government all helped to increase slowly
agricultural production. Under these conditions the Communist party
instituted a far-reaching program of land reforms.
The first major agricultural policy reform undertaken by the government
was the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 which attempted to eliminate the land-
lord system and redistribute rural capital to the poorer peasants. Land
reform resulted in 46 million hectares of land being redistributed among20
300 million peasants. The land, which represented about 45 percent of the
total arable land, had formerly been owned by between 10 and 12 million
persons. Two-thirds of the land was taken from landlords and one-third
from rich peasants, and was redistributed so that two-thirds was given to
poor peasants and one-third to middle-income peasants. (Gurley, 1974,
p. 387.) The reforms did not attempt to attain complete income equality.
Many of the rich peasants were allowed to keep much of their land and
other assets, and income differentials among rich, middle-income, and
poor peasants were still maintained after the reforms.
The political objective of the reform was to solidify the support
of the poor and middle-income peasants, the main supporters of the
Communist Party, by redistributing income and capital in the rural areas.
Gurley argues along the line presented by the Chinese government that the
process of land reform was instrumental in creating a psychological milieu
in the rural areas that made other reforms possible. This also created a
base of manpower willing to support government innovations (see Gurley,
1974, p. 338).
There were several problems that resulted from the land reforms.
Because the resale or rental of land was not forbidden, some of the redis-
tributed land quickly gravitated back to the rich peasants. The reforms
reduced the average size of farm units and increased the already serious
problem of field fragmentation. This led to an inefficient use of labor
and ruled out the effective use of mechanization. Another problem was
that the government was not able to step in immediately and provide ser-
vices that would have been provided by the old landlords, such as renting
implements, extending credit, marketing services, and processing of output.21
There is some measure of agreement that the effect of the land reforms
on agricultural output was not substantial and some authors even feel that
it was unfavorable (see N. R. Chen, 1969, p. 89).
Mutual-Aid Teams, 1952-mid-1955
Traditionally work in the fields peaked during the planting and har-
vesting seasons and those periods were characterized by acute labor shortages.
Farmers had frequently pooled their labor and their draft animals during
the peak seasons in an attempt to reduce the strain of these seasonal
fluctuations. The first organizational reform introduced by the Communists
was the mutual-aid team which attempted to utilize this traditional pattern.
Seven or eight households cooperated to use draft animals and farm imple-
ments as well as their own labor. The ownership of the capital goods and
land remained with the individual farmers and the teams functioned only
during the busy agricultural seasons. Later some teams were organized on
a permanent basis to allow the pursuit of subsidiary activities, such as
irrigation projects, livestock rearing, etc. during the winter months.
Another goal was to promote the purchase and utilization of capital goods
(draft animals and implements) that could be financed by a levy on each
member equal to 1 to 5 percent of the value of his annual output.
By 1954, almost 10 million mutual-aid teams, about half of them
seasonal and half permanent, were in operation, and they comprised 58 per-
cent of all peasant households. (Gurley, 1974, p. 389.) Throughout this
period the goal was to organize the mutual-aid teams so that the privately
owned land would be managed and worked in larger parcels but with each
household maintaining private ownership of the factors of production and
privately disposing of its share of the output. The main exceptions to22
this were some implements and animals that were purchased collectively
by team members.
Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives, mid-1955-Spring 1956
The Chinese government had maintained the position that socialistic
reforms were a prerequisite for any major technical change in the agri–
cultural sector, but until the fall of 1955 the government had stressed
the importance of socializing the rural areas slowly. In 1955 this policy
was revised and collectivizationwas given more emphasis.
Several factors contributed to the decision to move from mutual-aid
teams to cooperatives. First, the consolidation of production units and
centralized planning would enable the government to increase its control
over the distribution of output, investment, and consumption, which was
viewed as necessary for industrial growth. Larger agricultural production
units would help to overcome the severe problem of field fragmentation
which not only wasted land but also made irrigation projects and the use
of large implements uneconomical. Another problem facing the government
was the erosion of the political benefits from land reforms. The poor
peasant had become indebted to the middle-income and rich peasants,
the old landlord system was being reestablished by the sale of land, and
rural unemployment was increasing. Since the Communist leadership drew
its main support from the lower level peasantry this was a potentially
threatening political situation. These reasons, plus the confidence gained
from the excellent harvest in 1955, prompted the push for immediate reform
of the countryside.
During the last half of 1955 and early 1956 almost all households were23
organized into agricultural producers’ cooperatives containing from 30
to 40 households. This represented a major shift to more centralized con-
trol in the agricultural sector. Land, farm implements, draft animals, and
groups of trees were to remain privately owned but the use of these inputs
was to be centrally planned by the cooperative management on the basis of
targets handed down by the government. The cooperatives reimbursed members
for the land and tools used in accordance with a locally determined rent
schedule. Also, members were allowed to keep small plots for private use.
The cooperative management was instructed to attempt to acquire draft
animals, large implements, and groups of trees by purchasing these from
the members at locally determined prices. The distribution of the harvest
was also turned over to the cooperative management. First, the obligation
to the government in the form of taxes and required sale to government
agencies was honored. Then the “cost of production” was deducted, along
with an investment fund which usually amounted to about 8 percent of the
total output. Owners of land and other resources were paid rent and
finally the residual was distributed among the members as income.
The basic unit of production within the cooperatives, the team, was
organized along the lines of the old mutual-aid teams with seven or eight
households. Contracts were given by the cooperatives to the production
teame to maintain local work incentives. The peasants were then rewarded
, “,
by the team on the basis of the numb~r of “labor-days” earned.
Collectives, Spring 1956-August 1958
The third stage of the agricultural reforms was to organize the
elementary Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives into advanced Agricultural24
Producers’ Cooperatives (also known as Collectives). By the end of 1955,
official estimates claimed that 4 percent of the households were in collec-
tives, but by February 1956 the figure had climbed to 51 percent, in June
63 percent, and by December 88 percent. (Walker, 1965, p. 12.) The forma-
tion of the collectives was a major step in socializing the agricultural
sector. Collectives encompassed between 200 and 300 households, usually
from one large village or several small villages. Ownership of the land
was transferred from the peasants to the collectives without compensation.
Groups of trees, draft animals, and large implements were collectivized
and owners were compensated according to “local value.” The peasants
retained ownership of domestic livestock (pigs and poultry), small imple-
ments, and scattered trees. Private plots were still allowed. In essence,
the collectives were an addition of another layer to the organizational
structure; mutual-aid teams were retained, and the former structure of the
cooperatives became the small production brigades. The method of disposing
of the output under collective leadership remained basically the same as
under cooperatives except that there was no compensation to the peasants
for ownership of inputs. The activities of the collectives were lim~ted
to agricultural production and related projects.
One of the advantages of the collectives cited by Gurley was that due
to their larger size, the collectives were able to withhold larger per-
centages of the total output for collective purposes. (Gurley, 1974,
p. 390.) But on the negative side, Walker argues the collectives were not
successful in accomplishing the production goals set by the leadership.
Walker attributes part of this failure to a crucial lack of animal and
labor inputs. The agricultural policies that were proposed during that25
time period, close planting, deep plowing, and multiple cropping, were
labor-intensive. The Twelve Year Plan for agricultural development which
was formulated in 1956 stressed the more intensive use of traditional agri-
cultural inputs with labor being one of the most important. New techniques
raised the necessary level of labor input from the peasant in the fields
at the same time that large-scale public works projects were attempted
for the first time. Walker concluded that these heavy labor demands on
frequently counter-productiveprojects led to increased absenteeism from
collective work with more effort devoted to private plots, (Eckstein,






use of labor-intensive techniques, declining morale, and a wave
migration during 1957 resulted in a severe labor shortage during
harvest. This was one of the main factors in
the countryside into communes in August 1958.
Communes, August 1958-Spring 1959
The establishment of the communes was a much more




“Great Leap Forward” (GLF) aimed at the rapid industrialization and modern-
ization of China. The communes were to coordinate every type of activity
including agricultural planning and production, industry, education, banks,
health care, defense, and trade. The objective of this type of organization
was to provide a larger base for planning and more economically viable
units for undertaking large-scale water control projects and the construction
of small factories and workshops to utilize seasonally unemployed rural
labor. The commune became the basic local governmental unit and provided
schools and other social services.26
The basic organizational layers below the communes were the large
production brigades, roughly equivalent to the collectives, and the pro-
duction teams, which were roughly equivalent to the old cooperatives. The
average commune contained from 5,000 to 8,000 households with a range of
from 1,500 to 10,000.
The commune reforms marked the first major attempt to provide services
and food to the populace “according to need.” Communal dining halls were
established and a set percentage of the harvest was distributed equally
among all commune members regardless of labor contributed. Surplus food
was still distributed on the basis of “labor-days” worked. The private
plots and most domestic animals were collectivized.
During the GLF the leadership tried to modernize Chinese agriculture
by intensification of production. Stavis stated that the leadership
believed that labor inputs were the main constraint on production and the
communes were the result of attempts to increase the available labor
inputs. Therefore the most important innovation in the commune system was
the change in employment policy. Mass-mobilization campaigns were used to
engage the peasants in public works and industrialization as well as more
intensive field labor. Day-care centers and communal dining halls were
provided to facilitate the participation of women in the labor force.
Other formerly non-participating members, such as students and bureaucrats,
were also included in the manual labor force.
Labor participation was increased but there is substantial evidence
that labor efficiency dropped markedly. This was due to long hours, low
morale, and poorly planned, often counter-productiveprojects. For
example, Karcher reported that “Many communes in the autumn of 195827
switched 30-50 percent of their labor to mining and the making of coke,
charcoal, and the smelting of iron and steel in small primitive furnaces.”
(Karcher, 1975, p. 40.) Much of the output of these “backyard furnaces”
later proved to be unusable. Both manpower and materials were misused.
Many of the agricultural and industrial projects started were never comp-
leted. The “opportunity cost” of shifting labor from one project to
another, with some left unfinished, was ignored. In the countryside public
works and industrial projects were frequently given priority over agricul-
tural work and the result was a disastrous decline in agricultural output.
The failure of the Great Leap Forward provided several important
lessons for the leadership: (1) industrial activities in a basically
agrarian nation were largely dependent on agricultural production; (2)
simply “throwing” labor at a problem was not productive without increasing
other inputs and/or careful planning; (3) the commune system which had
attempted to offer necessities “according to need” had substantially
reduced the incentives for the labor force; and (4) there had been a short-
age of trained labor to manage the communes. This made the need for a
better rural education system more obvious.
1960-1976
The early 1960’s saw a major shift away from the economic policies of
the Great Leap Forward. The Chinese slowed the pace of industrialization
and reordered priorities to put the development of agriculture first. This
policy has been the major theme of Chinese development for the last fifteen
years.
The retreat from the commune system was in favor of smaller units of
organization. By 1961 the management and ownership of the land were given28
to the large production brigades and in 1962 the process of decentraliza-
tion continued with the ownership passing down to large production teams.
The decentralization trend has continued in the 1970’s with the subdividing
of large communes. Now there are approximately 50,000 communes compared
to 27,000 at the time of the Great Leap Forward.
The present scheme of rural organization has three main tiers of
authority: the commune, the production brigade, and the production team.
The average commune includes approximately 13,000 people, 2,900 households,
100 teams, and 15 brigades. The communes have retained responsibility
for providing some social services such as education, health care, police
protection, militia training, and relief during natural disasters. These
services are partly financed by the rental of commune-owned implements of ‘
production, e.g. tractors, to the production brigades and teams. Another
source of financing is a management fee paid to the commune by the teams.
This fee usually amounts to about 1 percent of the team income.
The communes are still responsible for industrial projects, investment
programs, and external relations. Rural industrializationmay become the
main activity of the rural communes. Although most of the control for
industrialization is now vested in the production brigades and teams, the
central government has gradually been trying to restore more power to the
communes through the rural industrializationprogram.
The level of organization between the team and the commune is the
production brigade. There are between 10 and 15 brigades in an average
commune and an estimated 750,000 brigades in all of China. The average
brigade contains seven production teams, 200 households, and 980 persons.
Although most brigades are engaged in agricultural production, some havespecialized to provide services for the whole commune--services such as
swine production, farm implement repair, fertilizer production, etc. The
brigades, like the communes, have retained ownership of some implements,
which are rented to the teams. Leadership of the brigades is provided by
local peasants, who are paid from local funds. The brigade is the lowest
level of direct party and government control.
The lowest but most important level of rural organization is the pro-
duction team, which is now larger than the original mutual-aid team. There
are approximately five million teams in all of China and the average team
includes 33 households or 145 persons. The average area cultivated by the
teams is 20 hectares or 49 acres. The team is responsible for making
specific plans for production, managing labor, accounting, and meeting
the output quota assigned by the government.
Households are still the basic unit of social organization in the
rural areas. There are an estimated 167 million households in China con-
taining on the average 4.4 persons with 1.9 labor force units. Income for
the households is computed primarily on the work points earned by individ-
uals incollective labor with supplements earned from the small private
plots. The sale of fruits and vegetables from private plots, domestically
raised pigs and poultry, and household handicrafts are all sources of
private income. The program of distributing food and services “according
to need” has been abandoned in all but a few places.
The previously discussed changes in rural organization, the increased
emphasis on agricultural investment and research, and emphasis on tech-
nical transformation of the agricultural sector, plus a return to more
favorable weather conditions, resulted in production increases after30
1964. Stavis estimates that from 1964 to 1967 China’s grain production
rose at an average annual rate of 6.0 percent per year. (Stavis, 1974,
p. 20.) However, this growth rate has not been sustained into the 1970’s.
“Since 1968, China’s grain production has grown at an average annual rate
of only 1.4 percent” (Stavis, 1974, p. 20).
Evaluation of Collectivization
The collective form of rural organization has offered several advan-
tages for agricultural development in China. In particular, this system
has facilitated a greater utilization of the rural labor force and the
collection of agricultural surplus. Other advantages are:
1. Production teams, the basic labor accounting units, are required
to provide food, income, and work for all members. Because these members
must be supplied with an income, it is in the best interest of the team
to utilize the labor as fully as possible even when the marginal product
of labor is below the wage rate.
2. This system allows a higher labor utilization rate in long-term
construction projects, since labor must be paid on a year-round basis.
3. Another reason that large-scale construction projects are favored
under a collective system is that all members are able to benefit from the
increased productivity. This is a definite incentive for labor since the
benefits from the project will not cease when the construction wages do.
4. Because of their size, communes are able to provide diversified
employment possibilities and attain some level of economic self-sufficiency,
5. Because collectivization has enlarged the working size of farm
plots, draft animals and mechanization can be utilized more,efficiently.
Also, less of the farmer’s time is spent traveling from field to field and31
less land is wasted on field boundaries. Both factors had been common in
traditional China.
6. Larger planning units allow more flexibility in planting time in
order to stagger harvesting and thereby alleviate the labor shortages at
those times.
7. While income distribution has not been completely equalized, the
extremes have been eliminated. Most of the leveling has taken place within
villages or communes--not between regions.
But the disadvantages of the collective system cannot be overlooked:
1. Because the teams do not have the right to dismiss members, labor
is not mobile in the rural areas to seek out the jobs with the highest
marginal productivity.
2. In come cases the push to utilize all available labor can lead to
the adoption of counter-productive projects or ones with very low productiv-
ity. This was often the situation during the GLF and resulted in widespread
peasant discontent and a virtual work stoppage.
3. Although planning has been largely decentralized since 1962,
central directives and quotas are still used. This may lead to the mis-
allocation of resources or the use of inefficient production techniques.
4. The collective system, to be efficient, requires careful planning
and competent management; neither was available when the system was intro-
duced and it is questionable whether they are now. Although the transfer
of large numbers of school-leavers and the creation of a rural education
system ameliorated the situation in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s,
there is still a shortage of skilled managerial talent in many areas.
5. Another fairly obvious problem with a collectivized system may be32
the lack of economic incentives usually associated with private ownership
of land, equipment and capital.
6. The Chinese development efforts may have been harmed by relying
too long and too much on the labor collectivization and utilization
strategies for increasing output. Stavis reached the conclusion that agri-
cultural production could not be substantially increased without modern
inputs--a factor neglected by the Chinese from 1949 to 1961. (Stavis,
1974, p. 7.)
The next four sections are devoted to a more detailed explanation of
the four main thrusts of Chinese employment policies: labor force partici-
pation, utilization, productivity, and incentives.
Labor Force Participation
Traditional Chinese society was characterized by a social and political
system in which the peasants supported a largely unproductive bureaucracy
and ruling class. The social system was also regimented so that women
rarely achieved their productive potential. The Communists have worked to
minimize class and social distinctions for both political and economic
reasons. The end result has been to increase the size of the labor force
available and “willing” to participate in manual agricultural labor.
The institutional changes described in the last section were instru-
mental in increasing labor force participation rates,
formerly landless peasants, women, older workers, and




In addition there are two other policies which have been used to
increase participation in the agricultural labor force. The first is to
regulate urban migration thereby keeping people in the rural areas where33
they are available for agricultural labor. The second policy is “hsia
fang” or “sending down,” which transfers people from the urban to the rural
areas thus making them available for agricultural labor.
Migration
The Chinese government has unequivocally rejected increasing the
urban industrial work force as a potential solution for the rural unemploy-
ment problem. The government has pursued an active policy of discouraging
urban migration for four reasons. First, it is reasoned that the urban
unemployed must be supported by the government thus creating a drain on
existing welfare funds. If these people must be subsidized, it is more
desirable to retain labor in the rural areas where it is easier to find
labor-intensivework and where it is assumed that the marginal product of
labor is always greater than zero. Second, the Chinese plan to move the
industries away from the crowded eastern coastal areas and into the country-
side will cut transportation costs for agriculturally-based industries,
keep the labor force near the farms so their labor can be utilized in the
fields during peak demand periods, and facilitate the distribution of manu-
factured goods in the rural areas. Third, the Chinese are most interested
in fully utilizing the existing urban labor force before allowing new
immigrants. For example, if both a husband and wife are encouraged to seek
employment, the labor force has been increased without increasing the need
for more housing or food in the urban areas. Also, the government would
be able to cut political tension if urban school-leavers could be employed
in their home areas rather than dispatched to rural areas to engage in
agricultural labor. Fourth is the Chinese belief that citizens are more
easily controlled and less politically volatile if they remain in their34
home villages with strong familial and cultural controls.
The Chinese seem to have achieved a fair degree of success in limiting
urban growth by using the following techniques: limited recruitment for
urban industries or even recruitment bans for certain areas, rationing cards
for essential commodities, foreceble deportation of illegal immigrants, and
a systematic program to resettle the urban unemployed in rural areas. But
as the following brief history will show, urban migration rose rapidly
during periods of waning governmental control.
During the First Five Year Plan (1953-1957) the government tried to
formulate a policy for limiting urban employment recruitment, but after the
collectivization drive of 1956-57 the urban influx increased, especially
in the industrial centers of the West and Northwest. Because productivity
in the agricultural sector was largely dependent on traditional inputs,
especially labor, production dropped. This led to a stricter migration
policy formulated by the State Council and the Central Committee. Industries
were to limit recruitment to the urban unemployed, rural authorities were
to limit the number of peasants given identification papers for migration,
and unauthorized migrants were halted en route and sent back to the country-
side. The public security forces were mobilized to seek out illegal
migrants and dispatch them to the countryside. The ration card system for
necessary commodities was also used after 1956 as a tool with the cards
valid for only one area. When recruitment of rural laborers was necessary
for urban industries, the permission of the agricultural cooperative was
required. But even these stringent measures proved somewhat ineffective.
The estimated increase in urban population was 15.6 million in 1958. Of
this figure, 10 million were rural migrants. (Donnithorne, 1967, p. 183.)35
The drop in agricultural production during the Great Leap Forward
resulted partially from an outflux of agricultural labor and convinced
the leadership that the transfer of agricultural labor to other sectors
would lead to a decline in production. But by 1961 the rural outflux was
still so great that the government placed a three-year ban on recruiting
rural labor for industry.
During the 1960’s, industries that needed rural labor had to arrange
contracts with specific agricultural communes. Frequently the families
remained in the countryside while only the industrial laborer lived in the
city and part of the labor wage was returned to the commune.
Now urban industries are required to work through a municipal employ-
ment bureau to hire new employees. The bureau tries to use the existing
urban labor force if possible. The bureaus will employ rural recruits only
as a last resort.
Other obstacles facing the would-be urban migrants are the food and
clothing ration system and the housing allocation system. The process of
changing the “location” for food and clothing rations is difficult and
time-consuming. Also, securing an apartment in the city without a job is
virtually impossible.
These measures, while certainly incapable of stopping the flow of
migrants to the cities, have slowed the flow and encouraged the labor
force to remain in rural areas where they are available for agricultural
production.
Hsia Fang
In addition to limiting urban migration the Chinese have used the





urban population. The main thrust of the
has been to remove permanently and potentially unem-
and secondary school-leavers) from urban areas. Other,
of this program have been to temporarily send cadres,
students, and factory workers to the countryside for work shifts during
peak labor demand periods.
The ten-point economic readjustment program adopted by the National
People’s Congress in April 1962 attempted to reduce excess urban population
to the countryside. Usually a person was allowed to return to his or her
native village. The goal was to reduce
million. The push to control migration
tinued during the Cultural Revolution.
urban population from 130 to 110
and reduce urban population con-
It has been estimated that approx-
imately ‘tenmillion youngsters were transferred to the countryside during




same time period. “From 1966 to 1970, one million inhabitants
seem to have left Shanghai, especially young graduates,
and party cadres.” (Deleyne, 1973, p. 59.)
Opinions differ widely on how successful the Chinese have been at
limiting urban migration. The general consensus of China-watchers seems
to be that the “sending down” movement has offset some of the unauthorized
migration to urban areas. It is clear from the accounts of foreign visitors





of openly unemployed labor in most cities.
a new dimension has been
numbers of underemployed
and urban areas and sent
added to the urban-rural migration
and unemployed have been pulled
to the frontier regions. These
settlers serve a dual function: to develop agriculture in the desert37
regions and to provide military reserves along the Soviet border. Their
total numbers are about 600,000 in Sinkiang, 300,000 in the Autonomous
Region of Mongolia, 200,000 in Heilungkiang, and over 100,000 in Chin@ai
and Tibet. (Deleyne, 1973, p. 60.)
Labor Force Utilization
The Chinese have worked to increase utilization of the labor force to
contribute the greatest possible gain for economic development. Given
China’s resource endowments--rich in labor, poor in capital and land per
capita--labor must be substituted whenever possible for scarce resources.
Much of the work dome in the rural areas such as irrigation, reforestation
and land reclamation was accomplished with a very high labor-capital ratio.
Collectivization has been an important component in the plan to increase
utilization rates. Ideally, the labor input contributed by any individual
is no longer constrained by the private ownership of complementary capital
or land. Also the move to larger planning and financing units, e.g. the
brigades and communes, has made large-scale public works projects possible.
The development of brigades and communes has increased the demand for
labor in non-agricultural activities as well. The most important example
of this is the rural industrializationprogram. The collective strategy
was conducive to mass-mobilization of the labor force for projects that
could use either temporarily or permanently unemployed labor.
Mass-Mobilization
Mass-mobilization as an employment strategy was developed by the Chinese
Communists during the Yenan Period (1937 to the end of World War 11) to meet38
the tremendous labor demands of simultaneously fighting the Japanese and
Kuomingtang, organizing a new government, and achieving self-sufficiency
in food production. Robert C. Hsu has defined mass-mobilization in economic
development as “the organizational efforts undertaken by the government to
increase the masses’ enthusiasm for, and participation in production and/or
capital formation by ideological, remunerative or coercive means. Its
objective is to increase the quantity and/or productivity of labor available
for production and economic development.” (Hsu, 1975, p. 165.) In prac-
tice mass-mobilization campaigns have been organized for both political
and economic objectives, covering the gamut from studying the Red Book of
Mao to hauling dirt on human backs to build a dam.
Hsu argues that “near-optimum conditions existed during the Yenan
Period which helped to carry the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to its
success; that the experience of that success influenced the CCP’S pro-
clivity for mobilization in the post-1949 period and that because of less
favorable circumstances after 1949, post-1949 mobilizations were not as
successful.” (Hsu, 1975, p. 165.) One of the major factors listed by Hsu
as a change to more unfavorable circumstances was that advanced agricultural
cooperatives and communes removed the immediate benefits of increased pro-
ductivity from the peasants. Also the mass-mobilization campaigns fluc-
tuated in a cyclical pattern often reaching excesses during the peaks.
This was especially true during the Great Leap Forward when literally
hundreds of thousands of peasants were marched off to build factories,
level or terrace new farm lands, construct irrigation systems, or engage
in a variety of other developmental activities. Critics of this period can
find ready evidence for criticizing this policy. Much of the harvest of1958 was left in the fields because of an agricultural labor shortage.
The government on all levels had overestimated the amount of labor that
could be pulled from the fields without reducing output--a problem that
was compounded by the large urban migration which accompanied social
upheaval in the countryside.
The importance of mass-mobilization as a tool in China’s development
should not be underestimated. This strategy was responsible for a great
deal of the infrastructure development in the past. Present trends seem
to indicate that the strategy will continue to be used but will be
tempered by the leadership’s knowledge that excesses lead to both unaccept-
able and unanticipated economic costs.
Rural Industrialization
Rural industrializationwill be important in employment policies as
a potential employer of seasonally underemployed agricultural labor and
unemployed persons in rural areas. The push for rural industrialization
has several rationales: to halt urban migration and congestion, to locate
factories closer to the sources of inputs and rural markets, to disperse
industries in case of war, and to more fully utilize the rural labor force.
The Great Leap Forward was the first major, albeit unsuccessful,
attempt to spread industries in the rural areas with numerous small-scale
fertilizer plants and “backyard furnaces” for pig iron built with limited
capital investment. Many of these endeavors were planned to provide
inputs for the heavy industries located in the cities. The “failure” of
the GLF marked a major change in the investment priorities of the Chinese
government. The emphasis switched from heavy industries concentrated in
urban centers as prescribed by the Soviet development model to investment40
in agriculture and agriculture-relatedor light industries in the rural
areas (see N. R. Chen, 1969, p. 48). This official change in priorities
was not a rejection of the importance of heavy industry but rather an
attempt to develop diversified industry centered in the agricultural sector,
either producing inputs for agriculture or processing the agricultural out-
put as a first step in the development process.
The call for small, indigenous, locally controlled industries was
reiterated in 1964 but with more realistic plans than during the Great
Leap Forward. The industries were to include producing and repairing
farm implements and machinery; producing fertilizers, insecticides, pesti-
cides, consumer goods, handicrafts, building materials, rural transporta-
tion equipment; processing agricultural output; and developing power sources.
The rural areas were also expected to develop other basic industries such
as iron and steel production, cement making, and coal mining, Chen
reported in 1969 that:
About 20% of the commune labor force has been organized into
teams devoted to subsidiary production. In areas where the poten-
tial for subsidiary activities is great, over half the peasants
may be diverted into these activities.
Subsidiary production has become a major source of cash
income for the peasants, and in many communes contributed more
than half of their gross income. For the country as a whole,
subsidiaries are said to have constituted one-third of the gross
value of agricultural and subsidiary production and 40 percent of
the state procurement of these products. (N. R. Chen, 1969, p. 103.)
The theme of rural industrializationwas again presented at the Tachai
Conference. The state has given a great deal of freedom to the rural areas
to initiate projects which best utilize local resources. The responsibil-
ity for generating capital to finance these projects is also left with the41
local areas, except in the case of large-scale projects when the govern-
ment will provide some funds. Peking hopes that as industrialization
continues, the communes will regain economic importance and take back the
power of economic planning which is now vested in the production teams.
Rural industrialization could have a profound effect on the employment
situation in the Chinese countryside. In a 1972 visit to Tsunhua county,
Jon Sigurdson found 10 to 15 percent of the labor force employed in indus-
trially related pursuits. Sigurdson argues that increasing rural employ-
ment may be the long-run outcome of industrialization although it is not
immediately evident that is is a goal in the short run. Many of the indus-
tries are capital-intensivenow but are producing equipment which will
later be used to employ more labor. (Sigurdson, 1972, p. 321.) Sigurdson
pointed out in a later article that industrializationwill cause a change
in the quality of labor used and the quality of rural life.
Labor Incentives
Since 1949 the Chinese have fluctuated between relying on ideological
and economic incentives. During some periods the government moved towards
making income more responsive to work effort, allowing the private sector
to coexist with the socialist sector, and manipulating policy to leave more
of the agricultural surplus in rural areas for reinvestment. But these
policies have not been consistently applied. During other periods, most
notably the Great Leap Forward, the government relied more on ideological
rewards with calls for collective responsibility and selflessness~ the
economic reward system was no longer closely tied to work effort, polit-
ical goals were given priority over economic ones, and the private sector
was suppressed. But the two types of incentives, economic and ideological,42
should not be seen as mutually exclusive. At all times both types of
incentives have been present, but in varying degrees. Although this paper
is more directly concerned with economic incentives, the Maoist develop-
ment strategy has put great emphasis on ideological incentives.
Work motivation in China has also risen, according to the Maoists,
because of an increase in socialist consciousness among the masses
of workers and peasants, which means that collective incentives--
the willingness to work hard for increasingly larger groups of
people without expectation of personal gain--have gained over
individual’ones. Maoists believe that people are inspired and
can see real meaning in their lives only if they are working for
goals worthy of human beings and not merely for their own selfish,
material welfare. (Gurley, 1974, p. 403.)
The most important tools used by the government to regulate economic
incentives are the private sector, income and accounting procedures, and
policies such as agricultural-industrialterms of trade, taxes, and imports.
Collective Income
Collective income is now based on earned work points. The work points
are determined and computed by the production teams for labor devoted to
collective farming and construction projects. The government has limited
the former practice of granting work points for political study or adminis-
trative duties. The work point scales are geared to encourage part-time
work by formerly underutilized segments of the population, such as women,
youth and older workers. This trend was reinforced last year with more
generous work point scales for these groups.
Chinese planners argue that changing the accounting unit from the
large communes to the small production teams has more directly linked
individual rewards to productivity. Also the production teams are roughly43
the size of small villages and the philosophy behind using these as the
labor accounting units is that there will be a strong network of social
ties, obligations, and loyalties which will increase the peer and family
pressure to work efficiently.
Stavis estimates that from the early 1950’s to the late 1960’s, rural
income roughly doubled, from an average of 70 Yuan to 150 Yuan per capita.
(Stavis, 1974, p. 54.) Incomes have been rising very slowly since 1971.
It is difficult, if not impossible,to compare the standard of living
by converting the Yuan to U.S. dollars because the Yuan is grossly under-
valued and because many public services are available free of charge in
China. But Reynolds offers these comparisons: the conversion of Yuan to
U.S. dollars shows that the Chinese GNP per capita is in the neighborhood
of $150 but on closer examination, if the standard of living available in
China were priced in the U.S., the dollar value would be a great deal
higher. (For a more detailed explanation see Reynolds, 1975, p. 426.)
The Private Sector
In addition to the earnings from collective labor, the peasants have
regained the right to cultivate private plots. In the past the position
of the central government on the private plots reflected the general
policies being encouraged in rural areas.
It is no exaggeration to state that Chinese policy towards the
private sector of agriculture proved to be probably the most
important single barometer of political and economic stability
in the countryside during the period 1956-62. (Walker, 1965,
p. xvii.)
The peasants lost the right to cultivate private plots during the Great
Leap Forward but it was returned in the early 1960’s. The 1975 constitution44
reaffirmed the right of the peasants to cultivate private plots. The
total land allocated for private plots is not to surpass 7 percent of the
cultivated area.
In 1974 the central government issued a call to the peasants not to
neglect their duty to collective labor in favor of working on the private
plots and specified that peasants were to pursue private activities only
after collective responsibility was fulfilled. This seems to indicate
that a disproportionate amount of work time was being spent on the plots
and that the private return to labor is higher on the private plots. The
produce of the private plots is noc included in national output data so
it is impossible to determine exactly how significant the private sector
is, but it is generally assumed that the private sector is the major
source of fruits and vegetables.
In addition to the private plots, the peasants are allowed to earn
private income in sideline activities such as pottery making and woodcraft
and by raising poultry and pigs. The government stance on the private
sector in the countryside has become more permissive in the last year.
Stavis estimates that the private sector (private plots and family handi-
crafts and animals) now contributes around 20 percent of the total rural
income and this percentage is higher in wealthier areas. (Stavis, 1974,
pP. 56-57.)
The growing importance of the private sector has contributed to the
already existing income differentials among rural communes and regions.
Income Differentials
One of the most difficult problems now confronting Chinese economic
planners is balancing the terms of trade and income differentials between45
rural and urban areas. This is because the
cerned with the content and distribution of
of increasing per capita income.
Maoists are extremely con-
income as well as the goal
The average income of a peasant throughout China is probably less
than 150 Yuan per working person, whereas that of the workers in
the town factories, who are admittedly only a small proportion
of the population, is about 700 Yuan a year. On the other hand,
life in the country is easier since provisions cost 30% less than
in town, being distributed directly by the team to its members
without any charge for transport, storage, processing, and market-
ing. Lodging is generally free. So are fuel and water. Lastly,




plot or at home. (Deleyne, 1973, p. 76.)
also growing income differentials among rural communes
increased importance of sideline activities as a source of
income, the intensive use of modern agricultural inputs in specified
“high-yield” areas, and the present emphasis on “self-sufficiency” and
“self-reliance” which rules out large-scale government intervention to
try and equalize incomes. “Perkins reports a 1965 survey of thirteen
communes which revealed that income per worker in the richest commune
was 3.4 as high as in the poorest.” (Reynolds, 1975, p. 426.)
Stavis offers further
entials in rural communes:
insight into the causes of the income differ-
The agricultural planning system in China strongly encourages
the communes to emphasize food production until self-sufficiency
is reached. Once a locality produces enough of surplus grain it
can divert resources (land and labor) to higher-priced subsidiary
crops such as fruits, vegetables, oil and fiber crops, animal
husbandry, sericulture, bee-keeping or local handicrafts and
industry. As a result, once a locality succeeds in raising grain
production, it has the opportunity to raise fairly rapidly the
cash income of the farmers. (Stavis, 1974, PP. 54-55.)
This has become a problem not only as it comments on a Communist46
society but also as a potential source of rural discontentment which has
already been fueled by the mass influx of former Red Guards and students
to rural areas in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.
Governmental Policy
In addition to the private incentives discussed above there are three
general economic policies that the Chinese government has used to motivate
the farming sector: a slowly rising agricultural tax, terms of trade which
favor the agricultural sector, and the grain import program.
The agricultural tax has not been used to extract all the benefits of
agricultural development from the countryside. The land tax is set accord-
ing to the quality of the land and the expected value of output. Since
the tax is based on expected output rather than a percentage of actual
output and is revised infrequently (not more than once every three years),
the incremental increases in output due to development remain with the
peasants. Also as new land is brought under cultivation, the taxes are
not levied for several years. Stavis estimated that the tax system just
described has made the agricultural tax a declining percentage of the pro-
duction unit’s operating costs, often about 5 percent. (Stavis, 1974,
p. 141, and Maxwell, 1975, p. 476.) Also Stavis argues that the rate of
government extraction of the benefits of agricultural development has been
low enough to assure peasant work incentives. Stavis argues that the
peasants retain about 65 percent of the increments in production resulting
from the use of modern techniques (Stavis, 1974, p. 74).
In addition to the agricultural tax there is also a tax on industrial
products sold to agriculture.47
The largest tax charged to the agricultural sector by the state
is the tax that represents the difference between the sales price
of goods sold to agriculture and the cost of producing and market-
ing those goods. This tax, of course, has risen as retail sales
have risen and has fallen whenever prices of producer or other
goods sold to agriculture have been cut. As a percentage of farm
income, this tax (actually taxes) has probably fallen. (Perkins,
1975, p. 363.)
Both of these taxes are combined into a single bill charged to the
production team (or whatever level of organization serves as the accounting
unit). In an attempt to estimate the net effect of these taxes, Perkins
suggests that the net drain on agriculture has declined when expressed as
a percentage of farm income measured in current prices and may have even
been reduced in real terms. (Perkins, 1975, p. 364.)
The second form of indirect incentives offered to rural peasants is
the favorable terms of trade to the agricultural sector. Since 1950,
terms of trade have been maintained favoring the agricultural sector.
The general policy is to gradually increase the price paid to the teams
for farm products but to allow input prices to fall in response to increas-
ingly efficient production techniques. For example, in the fall of 1971
the price of most industrial crops was increased while the price of some
industrially produced farm inputs was reduced. (“The price paid for sugar
was increased by 15.3 percent and for oilseeds by an average of 16.7 percent.
The prices of chemical fertilizers and insecticides were reduced by 9.7
percent, and various types of agricultural machinery and tools by an aver-
age of 15.7 percent.” (Erisman, 1975, p. 332.)
Although this policy did increase labor incentives through greater
potential earnings, it also made production of industrial crops more




Also individuals started devoting more




TO date the government has maintained the price shift, but in 1974
the government tried to temper the shift to industrial crops by ordering
that specified areas plant more grain and by specifying that the first
obligation of the peasants was to collective labor, not private cultivation.
There is no evidence that this or similar incidence have changed che basic
governmental policy of subsidizing rural investment and income by cutting
the price of inputs and increasing the price of outputs.
Since 1961 China has annually imported between four and six million
tons of wheat and barley from Canada, Australia, and Argentina, costing
approximately $300-500 million per year. One possible and plausible
explanation of the grain imports is that they are being agricultural pro-
duction incentives. Using foreign grain imports to help
makes it possible for the government to allow production
larger portion of any increases in grain output. “Grain
feed urban areas
teams to keep a
imports, in
effect, are what backstops government guarantees that grain tax and purchase
quotas will not be raised frequently or by large amounts.” (Perkins, 1975,
p. 365.)
Labor Productivity
There are several reasons why the Chinese
productivity. The first is that in most areas
is still a distant goal and in the foreseeable
must strive to increase labor
of the country modernization
future traditional inputs
will continue to dominate the agricultural sector. This situation cannot
be changed significantly in the near future so a basic development strategy
must be to rely on a controllable input, labor, to increase productivity49
from scarce resources such as land and capital. A second reason is the
growth of rural industry, which is usually labor-intensive and will be
competing with agriculture for the local labor supply. Also the enactment
of large-scale public works projects, land reclamation, and irrigation
projects, etc. can tax the supply of labor in many localities. The
Chinese policy makers realized after the disastrous 1958 agrarian labor
shortage, that the marginal productivity of labor to farming is not zero
and that withdrawing large segments of the farm population for other pursuits
would precipitate a decline in output. An extension of this leads to
another consideration for Chinese policy makers--the threat of a war with
the Soviet Union. The planners must certainly be cognizant that the recruit-
ment of a large percentage of the rural population for military duty
would cripple the agricultural sector.
Underlying this discussion of increased labor force efficiency is
again the philosophy of the Chinese leadership that China is not a “labor
surplus” economy. Therefore technical change in the agricultural sector
is seen as necessary to allow labor to move to pursuits with higher marginal
productivity.
The emphasis on technical change started in the 1960’s after having
been neglected during the 1950’s. Chinese planners realized early in 1960
that they were approaching the limit to increased output that could be
achieved by relying solely on traditional inputs. Since that time technical
change has been considered the key to increasing agricultural output.
The current policy stated at the National Conference on Learning from
Tachai in Agriculture in November 1975 has not changed from the farm
policies developed under the National Agricultural Development Program and50
approved at the National People’s Congress in
which was originally scheduled for completion
fulfilled in 1976. The main goal of the plan
April 1960. The plan,
in 1967, was expected to be
was to increase agricultural
yields by utilizing technical change within the framework of local conditions.
There are two slogans that have been devised to state the main technical
and agricultural changes stressed in Chinese policy. The first is the
“Eight Character Charter” formulated by Mao Tse-tung. The eight points are:
(1) increase production by improving soil through land construction, (2)
fertilizer, (3) water control and irrigation, (4) improved varieties of
seeds, (5) suitable spacing of plants or close planting, (6) better farm
tools, (7) pest control and plant protection, and (8) improved field man-
agement and double cropping. The second slogan calls for “Four Changes”:
mechanization, chemicalization, electrification, and irrigation.
Most of these changes have been concentrated in twelve “high and stable
yield” areas covering roughly 20 percent of the cultivated area in China.
(Stavis, 1974, p. 22.) The changes are being introduced in other areas
but in a slower and less systematic fashion.
In the following sections the major tools used by the Chinese to
increase labor productivity in the rural areas will be discussed.
Agricultural Investment
At present the government has continued to stress the policy of “self-
sufficiency.“ Local units are expected to generate internally the capital
for rural investment. This includes investment for rural industrialization
as well as agricultural inputs.
Much investment, indeed, is carried out at the lowest level of
rural commune. Each production team contributes 3 to 5 percent51
of its gross income to an “accumulation fund,” which finances
equipment purchases and other agricultural improvements by the
team. The production brigade and the commune draw revenue from
machinery leases and other services to the production teams, and
also from the profits of their industrial activities. The profits
of rural industrial enterprises, unlike the profits of urban
industries, are not remitted to the state. The funds remain in
the commune and are available for expansion of industrial activi-
ties or for agricultural investment. Commune officials report
that their present scale of industrial production has been built
up largely from reinvested earnings rather than through invest-
ment allocations from the
There is some government
of subsidies or loans to pool
state. (Reynolds, 1975, p. 421.)
capital available to communes in the form
with local resources. State investment has
begun to play a larger role in the rural areas in the last 15 years because
large-scale water conservation projects, electrical generation projects,
soil improvement projects and forest shelter belts all require large
capital investments and advanced technology.
Evidently, large-scale capital investment is still being opposed by
some segments of the Chinese populace. Leo Goodstadt’s report on the
Tachai conference stated: “Parts of the industrial and financial sectors
balk at diverting resources to the peasants. . . . The conference heard
of many districts where agriculture does not enjoy the top priority which
Peking has directed. It was told, according to an official report: ‘in
a number of places, the facade of economic construction is quite splendid,
but manpower, funds and material are not reasonably channeled to agricul-
ture.‘ In some cases agriculture is even neglected. Industries have not
geared their work towards taking agriculture as the foundation.” (Leo
Goodstadt, 1975, p, 45.)
Agricultural investment will be a powerful tool in controlling the
changes in technology, i.e. capital- or labor-intensive, which will in52
turn directly bear on employment policies. It is impossible to determine
from the literature how these investment decisions are made.
Mechanization
Mechanization is immediately relevant to employment policy in rural
China. Mechanization in China does not mean the introduction of Western-
style machinery, but rather the use of simple semi-mechanical devices to
help with ploughing and weeding and to replace human labor in the.pumping
of water, etc. There are data available to indicate that mechanization is
proceeding slowly but steadily in the “high and stable yield” target
regions,(see Stavisj 1974).
Mechanization was recently stressed at the Tachai Conference as part
of Peking’s program to modernize the agricultural sector. At first cut,
it seems paradoxical that a country as densely populated as China would
seek to replace labor with capital in the form of machinery. Several
explanations are possible:
1 . . . . the Chinese argue that the use of mechanized equipment will
save land which has become increasingly scarce in relation to labor,
since traditional methods of irrigation require much more land than
methods involving the use of mechanical power. Moreover, irrigation
by human and animal power may be too inefficient and slow to resist
the sudden advent of heavy rains and floods. (N.R. Chen, 1969, p. 122.)
2. G. F. Sprague reported after a 1974 tour of China that “In some areas
mechanical planting and harvesting are being introduced. The primary
objective is a saving of time rather than labor. A few days saved
in either the planting or harvesting season permits a greater degree
of flexibility in the multiple cropping scheme.” (Sprague, 1975,
p. 553.) Mechanization of both cultivation and grain processing are
being encouraged in the densely populated central and southern rice-
growing regions of China to permit multiple-cropping,53
3. In his account of the Tachai Conference, Leo Goodstadt offered the
following comments on mechanization:
Hua (Hua Kuo-feng) demanded the mechanization of agriculture by
1980. He urged that every level of the administration should
“make very great efforts to speed up the progress of this work.”
China decided to mechanize in 1974, and provincial reaction to Hua’s
address has focused heavily on this task. If the main cultivation
and farming operations achieved “70% mechanization~” Hua clafmedg
then “the mechanization of tilling, drainage, and irrigation and
transport alone would be equivalent to more than a 100% increase in
the labour force of the countryside as a whole.”
Since many key crops grown in China depend on intensive culti-
vation (rice and tea, for instance), such a dramatic increase in the
productive capacity of the labour force would amount to a revolution
in itself. Hua estimated that about 100 million people take part in
farmland capital construction each year during the slack winter
period. The maximum labour force which can be put onto the fields
is probably, therefore, around 150 million. At the moment, China
has only 20 million tractor drivers, technicians and electricians.
This ratio indicates the comparatively backward state of Chinese
cultivation.
Apart from a shortage of personnel, mechanization must put
strains on the rest of the economy in terms of machine tools, steel,
fuel, repair facilities and a substantial expansion of heavy
industry. (Leo Goodstadt, 1975, p. 45.)
4. Some areas of China, particularly in the northeast and northwest
regions, are sparsely populated and the use of mechanization can
supplement the labor force to increase productivity. This helps
to explain the greater use of tractors in the North. (Another con-
tributing factor may be that it is easier to mechanize the cultivation
of wheat than rice, which is the principal crop in the South.)
5. Politically, it is hoped that the use of machinery will expand the
scale of profitable operations and return more power to the communes
as a unit of planning and management and in essence, provide justi-
fication for the collective system.
6. Another possible factor in the decision to push mechanization is the
threat of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Because54
China’s agriculture is extremely labor-intensive, the prospect of
withdrawing a significant segment of the farm population from the
fields would result in a disastrous decline in output.
The pace of mechanization will be a key issue for planning employment
policy. It is possible that mechanization may proceed too rapidly in
certain areas without the accompanying growth of industries or other activ-
ities to absorb the manpower released. To date the Chinese have been
mechanizing slowly, covering one stage of production at a time, e.g.
threshing, plowing, or irrigation. It is assumed that the local decision-
makers will be able to make incremental changes in mechanization and
closely monitor the rate of trade-off between capital and labor. The
rate of growth in mechanization is now limited because the investment
must be made by the production team, but it is conceivable that in the
near future the income differentials among areas will be sufficient to all
allow rapid mechanization in some areas. Also the growth of rural indus-
tries which specialize in agricultural equipment will increase the avail-
ability and lower the price of these inputs. It is possible that those
industries would be able to absorb part of the labor supply released
through mechanization.
Water Control and Irrigation
Water control has always been a central theme in the Chinese agricul-
tural development program and is taking on even more importance with the
present attempts to modernize the agricultural sector. It appears that
China is going to have to move away from small-scale irrigation projects
into larger, more ambitious projects for several reasons. First, the
South already has a fairly well-developed traditional water control55
program, but the control problems in the North are so severe that small-
scale projects have consistently been unable to cope with the problem.
Second, while the use of small-scale irrigation projects may be adequate
for traditional farming techniques, the timely application of water assumes
a much greater importance in modernized agriculture. This is particularly
true in North China where large-scale projects with a capacity to store
large amounts of water are needed. This would seem to dictate a move away
from strictly labor-intensive projects.
The differences between the progress of irrigation in the north
as contrasted to that in the south cannot be accounted for by
any lack of effort in the northern regions. During the Great
Leap Forward years, 1958-1959, tens of millions of rural people
moved vast quantities of earth and rock in an attempt to solve
the northern water problem. But when the work was finished,
exaggerated claims discounted, and poorly designed projects
abandoned, there had been little if any expansion in irrigated
acreage. In the years 1959-61, in fact, &he north suffered
through one of the worst droughts in decades. The problem in
brief, was that the land of the north could not be irrigated by
methods that relied solely on the mobilization of rural labor
however great the number of people involved. (Perkins, 1975,
p. 359*)




of adequate water supplies for modern agriculture seem to indi-
the government may have to intervene to plan and finance larger-
more sophisticated projects. This shift is already under way.
The Chinese press has recently su8gested that the responsibility for the





production teams to the brigades so that larger, more complex
can be initiated.
implementation of irrigation programs will have several effects
allocation:56
1. The use of pumps for mechanized irrigation will displace labor that
may be absorbed by the more intensive cultivation and field management
requirements in modernized agriculture.
2. The labor requirement for maintaining the system will increase
dramatically.
The labor required to maintain China’s water control facilities is
staggering in amount . . . These requirements reduce the amount of
labor available for new construction. Maintenance consists of
periodic land leveling; dike repair; removal of silt, weeds and
debris from canals and ditches; and the repair of erosion to canal
walls. The amount of earthwork required each year to maintain a
system varies, but probably averages out to about 10 percent of the
earthwork required during construction. (Erisman, 1975, p. 337.)
3. In the short run, labor will need to be diverted from field work to
work on the construction of the projects. This may be a problem on
large-scale projects in the more sparsely populated areas of the North.
It is possible that the government may have to import construction
crews for temporary work from more densely populated areas in the
South.
Chemical Fertilizers
An increase in the amount of chemical fertilizers will presumably
change employment needs in two respects. First, in order to effectively
utilize the fertilizer, it must be integrated into a system of modern
agriculture. This requires effective water control, disease and pest
control, and sophisticated cultivation techniques, and competent management.
The requirement for better-trained management must be met by employment
policies. There are several policy alternatives available to the Chinese
to improve the quality of rural leadership. The rural education system
should be improved on all levels with special emphasi~ on advanced57
agricultural training for managers. Allowing greater labor mobility
between communes might lead to a more efficient allocation of skilled labor
resources. Finally, it seems that the requirement that managers and
scientists spend a significant percentage of their time engaged in physical
labor could be curtailed until a more adequate supply of agricultural
specialists was built up.
This leads to the second area where employment policies do not com-
plement the increased use of chemical fertilizers. In order to increase
productivity by raising the fertilizer input beyond a certain point, it is
necessary to develop fertilizer responsive seeds. Although fertilizer
responsive rice seeds are available, research on other crops has not been
as successful. The “evidence appears to indicate that the marginal yield
response to fertilizer did decline markedly between the mid-1960’s and the
early 1970’s.” (Perkins, 1975, p. 358,) Perkins attributes this to the
lack of more responsive seeds and suggests that the discovery of new seed
varieties is essential if China is to raise output with fertilizers. The
report of the American Plant Studies Delegation in 1974 suggested that
such discoveries were possible but they were contingent on a reorganization
of the research sector in China. The next section points out that the
research component of the agricultural sector is currently neglecting the
type of long-term coordinated experimentation needed to develop new seed
varieties. This is a critical shortcoming of the present employment
policies because scientific manpower is underutilized.
Agricultural Research
Part of the plan for developing the agricultural sector proposed by
the Tenth Plenum in 1962 included strengthening agricultural and research58
support services. From 1962 to 1965 the thrust of this policy was to uHe
fully the existing agricultural scientists, draw upon research being done
in other countries, provide centralized research facilities for Chinese
scientists, and expand educational facilities for new scientists. But
after 1965, i.e. after the Cultural Revolution$ the organization of the
agricultural research support system was questioned on political grounds.
The scientists were seen as the “new elite”; the benefits of the research
had gone mostly to the “high and stable yield areas” thus increasing income
inequalitieswithin the rural sector and the government, especially Mao,
felt that the existence of a separate research system lessened the role and
incentives of the peasants in the development process. It was also feared
that the separation of research and field work would result in largely
irrelevant academic style research divorced from the needs of the peasants.
After the Cultural Revolution, agricultural research organizations
were largely decentralized. Supervision of many of the research institutes
was transferred from the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences in Peking
to the provincial level scientific organizations and the provincial level
departments of agriculture. Research efforts were to be directed at the
immediate solution of practical crop and animal production problems at
the local level.
The report of the American Plant Studies Delegation which toured China
in 1974 indicates that the trends toward decentralized and immediately
applicable research has continued and agricultural research societies have
been disbanded. It seems that there is little or no long-range coordinated
research and that the emphasis is on small-scale localized problems with
work conducted in close consultation with the peasants.59
The decentralization process has more closely linked the research
and extension efforts in the provinces.
There are two primary institutional units for agricultural
research within a province: provincial level academies, insti-
tutes or colleges of agriculture; and small agricultural experi-
ment stations that are generally administered at the production
brigade level though in some cases are administered at the commune
or even county level. The provincial level units perform applied
research on the range of crops and animal species most common in
the province. To assure focus of these units on practical farm
problems, staff of the provincial level institutes, academies,
and colleges are stationed on a rotational basis at the “basic
points” at selected brigades. At any one time about one-third
of the staff would be so stationed. They also assist in the
training of technicians, farm managers and farmers.
The typical local agricultural experiment station focuses on the
major problems of the brigade and commune in which it is located.
Personnel from the following groups provide a cooperative effort to
solve the local problems: scientists from institutes, academies,
and colleges from both provincial and national levels who are sta-
tioned at the brigades; peasant technicians with special training
in applied research and extension activities; and crop production
managers at the brigade level. This provides the “three in one”
approach which assures not only the scientific and technical
quality of the work but also its direct applicability to problems
at the commune (farm) level. (American Plant Studies Delegation,
1975, p* 5.)
The “three-in-one” approach mentioned above refers to the policy of
combining scientists, technicians or administrators, and farmers in agricul-
tural research, decision-making, and policy formation.
The attempt to link the work of the scientific community with the
practical problems of the farmers was described by Ben Stavis. He reported
that in some areas, agricultural scientists spent one-third of their time
in specialized research institutes, one-third of their time doing field
research at communes, and one-third of their time touring and investigating
techniques and problems in the communes. (Stavis, 1974, pp. 171-172.)
The organization of agricultural research and the methods of utilizing60
trained agricultural scientists and researchers must be questioned in China.
The motivation for the present policy is to a large extent political with
the Chinese attempting to prevent the growth of a scientific elite. Although
the policy has been successful in linking research efforts with day-to-day
practical problems, long-term advanced agricultural research has been neg-
lected. The present system does not encourage rapid scientific development
or major innovations.
Future Prospects
The evidence clearly indicates that China has succeeded in increasing
both labor force utilization and participation rates. The Chinese contend
that these labor inputs have been effectively substituted for capital in
the early stages of development by using either labor-intensive or inter-
mediate technology. But, the evidence also indicates that China may have
come close to exhausting the benefits available under past policies--
increasing labor inputs, reorganizing the
land under cultivation, and incrementally
techniques.
rural sector, bringing marginal
improving traditional farming
The growth rate of Chinese agricultural output declined from 6 percent
annually from 1964 to 1968 to around 1.4 percent per year for the period
since 1968 (Stavis, 1974, p. 8). This stagnation raises several crucial
policy questions for the Chinese leadership.
One of the major obstacles to expanding agricultural output is the
lack of agricultural investment. The policy makers are now faced with
the dilemma that further modernization cannot be accomplished by simply
manipulating employment policies to increase labor inputs. Capital
investment is needed, and in many areas it is needed in amounts greater61
than can be internally generated in the region. The present government
policy of promoting local “self-sufficiency”and “self-reliance” is not
adequate to deal with existing problems, e.g. water control and recon-
struction after the 1976 earthquake in the North and machinery for
multiple cropping in the South. Given the limited capital resources of
the Chinese government, a program for increased agricultural investment
must confront the trade-off between political philosophy and economic
expediency. The government must either give priority to expanding total
output by investing in the “high and stable yield” areas or give priority
to more equitable income distribution by investing in the poorer areas
which are being “left behind” in the development process.
The central government still deals with income redistribution, but
to a much smaller extent than in the late 1950’s. Most redistribution
takes place within regions rather than between regions. Income differ-
entials have been increasing and will continue to do so if the present
investment trends continue. This is one of the issues that must be decided
in the current power struggle in China.
There has been considerable dissension within the Chinese government
for several years over the future course of agricultural development.
Stavis attributes this to the growing awareness among policy makers that
there are numerous options open to China (Stavis, 1973). The conflict has
intensified in the post-Mao transitional period. Hwa Kuo-feng stands
opposed to the more radical elements who are pushing for rapid social-
ization of the rural sector. To date, Hwa has supported the policies set
forth at the Tachai.Conference, i.e. a program for the gradual modernization
of the agricultural sector within the present “cellular” political and62 .
economic context. But because of the present state of political flux,
it is impossible to predict what course agricultural development will
take in China.63
BIBLIOGIUiPHY
American Plant Studies Delegation. Plant Studies in the People’s Republic
of China: A Trip Report of the American Plant Studies Delegation.
Washington, D. C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1975.
Ashbrook, Arthur G. “China: Economic Overview.” in U.S. Congress. China:
A Reassessment of the Economy. 1975, pp. 20-51.
Aziz, Sartaj. “The Rural Sector and the Application of Technology.” World
Development. Vol. 2, No. 2, Feb. 1974, pp. 87-91.
Buck, John Lossing. Chinese Farm Economy: A Study of 2866 Farms in Seventeen
Localities and Seven Provinces in China. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1930.
Buck, John Lossing, Owen L. Dawson, and Yuan-li Wu. Food and Agriculture in
Communist China. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966.
Butterfield, Fox. “Chinese Plan Aims at Rural Progress.” Minneapolis Tribune.
Jan. 5, 1976, pp. 1 and 7A.
Cell, Charles Preston. Making the Revolution Work: Mass Mobilization
Campaigns in the People’s Republic of China. Ann Arbor: Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973.
Chao, Kang. Agricultural Production in Communist China, 1949-1965. Madison,
WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.
Chen, Nai-Ruenn and Walter Galenson. The Chinese Economy under Co~unism.
Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969.
Crook, Frederick W. “Chinese Communist Agricultural Incentive Systems and
the Labor Productive Contracts to Households: 1956-1965.” Asian
w“ Vol. 13, No. 5, MSy 1973, pp. 470-481.
Dawson, Owen L. Communist China’s Agriculture: Its Development and Future
Potential. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
Deleyne, Jan. The Chinese Economy. London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1973.
Donnithorne, Audrey. China’s Economic System. New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1967.
Eckstein, Alexander, Walter Galenson, and Ta-chung Liu. Economic Trends
in Communist China. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968.64
Erisman, Alva Lewis. “China: Agriculture in the 1970’s.” in U.S. Congress.
A Reassessment of the Economy, 1975, pp. 324-349.
Field, Robert Michael. “Chinese Agriculture in the 1970’s: Production,
Food
Consumption, and Trade.” Asian Survey. Vol. 13, No. 10, Oct. 1973,
pp. 908-913.
and Agriculture Organization. General Guidelines to the Analysis of
Agricultural Production Projects. Rome: Agricultural Planning
Studies, No. 14, 1971.
Fung, K. K. “Output vs. ‘Surplus’Maximization: The Conflicts between
the Socialized and the Private Sector in Chinese Collectivized
Agriculture.“ The Developing Economies. Vol. 12, March 1974, pp. 41-55.
Goodstadt, Leo. China’s Search for Plenty: The Economics of Mao Tse-tung.
New York: Weatherhill, 1973.
Goodstadt, Leo. “A Forceful Message to Rural China.” Far Eastern Economic
Review. Vol. 90, No. 45, Nov. 7, 1975, pp. 42 and 45.
Gurley, John G. “Rural Development in China, 1949-1972 and the Lessons to
Be Learned from It.” in Edgar O. Edwards (cd.) Employment in Developing
Nations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, pp. 383-403.
Hou, Chi-ming. “Manpower, Employment, and Unemployment.” in Eckstein,
Galenson, and Liu. (eds.), Economic Trends in Communist China.
Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968, pp. 329-396.
Hsu, Robert C. “Mass Mobilization as a Strategy of Economic Development:
The Case of Chinese Agriculture in Yenan Period (1936-45) and Post-
1949 Period.” Weltwirtschaft Liches Archiv. Vol. 3, No. 1, 1975,
pp. 164-175.
Karcher, Martin. “Unemployment and Underemployment in the People’s
Republic of China.” China Report. Vol. 11, No. 5 and 6, Sept.-Dee.
1975, pp. 22-49.
Karcz, Jerry F. “Comparative Study of Transformation of Agriculture in
Centrally Planned Economies: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and
Mainland China.” in Erik Thorbecke. The Role of Agriculture in
Economic Development. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
Klatt, W. “China’s Economy after the National People’s Congress.” China
-“ Vol. 11, No, 2, March-April 1975, pp. 29-39.
Lardy, Nicholas R. “Economic Planning in the People’s Republic of China:
Central-ProvincialFiscal Relations. in U.!?:Congress. A Reassessment
of the Economy. 1975, pp. 94-115.
Lau, Lawrence. “Peasant Consumption, Saving, and Investment in Mainland
China.” in Jackson, W. A. Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist
and Non-Communist Countries. Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1971, pp. 305-337.65
Liu, Ta-chung, and Kung-chia Yeh. The Economy of the Chinese Mainland:
National Income and Economic Development, 1933-1959. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965.
Maxwell, Neville. “Learning from Tachai.” World Development. Vol. 3,
No. 7-8, July-Aug. 1975, pp. 473-495.
Orleans, Leo A. “China’s Population: Can the Contradictions Be Resolved?”
in U.S. Congress. A Reassessment of the Economy. 1975, pp. 69-80.
Perkins, Dwight. Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968. Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Co., 1969.
Perkins, Dwight H. “Centralization and Decentralization in Mainland
China’s Agriculture, 1949-1962.” Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Vol. 78, No. 311, Feb. 1964, pp. 208-237.
Perkins, Dwight. “Constraints Influencing China’s Agricultural Performance.”
in U.S. Congress. A Reassessment of the,Econ~. 1975, pp. 350-365.
Prybyla, Jan S. “Hsia-fang: The Economics and Politics of Justification
in China.” Pacific Affairs. Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer 1975, pp. 153-172.
Reynolds, Lloyd G. “China as a Less Developed Economy.” American Economic
Review. Vol. 65, No. 3, June 1975, pp. 418-428.
Robinson, Joan. “Chinese Agricultural Communes.” in Charles K. Wilber.
(cd.) The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment.
New York: Random House, 1973, pp. 209-215.
Schran, Peter. The Development of Chinese Agriculture, 1950-1959. Urbana:
University of Illinois, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 1969.
Shih, Joseph Anderson. “Science and Technology in China.” Asian Survey.
Vol. 12, No. 8, Aug. 1972, pp. 662-675.
Sigurdson, Jon. “Report from China: Rural Industry--A Traveller’s View.”
China Quarterly. Vol. 50, April/June 1972, pp. 315-332.
Sigurdson, Jon. “Rural Industrialization in China: Approaches and Results.”
World Devehlpment. Vol. 3, No. 7-8, July-Aug. 1975, pp. 527-538.
Sprague, G. F. “Agriculture in China.” Science. Vol. 188, No. 4188,
May 9, 1975, pp. 549-555.
Stavis, Benedict. Political Dimensions of the Technical Transformation of
Agriculture in China. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University, 1973.
Stavis, Benedict. Making Green Revolution: The Politics of Agricultural
Development in China. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University, 1974.66
Stavis, Benedict. “China’s Rural Local Institutions in Comparative
Perspective.“ Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 4, April 1976, pp. 381-396.
Tobin, John, “The Economy of China: A Tourist’s View.” Challenge.
March-April 1973, pp. 20-31.
United Nations Economic and Social Council. “The Employment Problem.”
Development Digest. Vol. 7, No. 4, Oct. 1969, pp. 3-16.
United States Congress. Joint Economic Committee. China: A Reassessment
of the Economy. Washington: Government Printing Office, 94th
Congress, 1st Session, July 10, 1975.
United States Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Priorities
and Economics in Government. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union
and China--l975. Washington: Government Printing Office, 94th
Congress, 1st Session, July 1975.
United States Congress. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House
International Relations Committee. The United States and China.
Washington: Washington: Government Printing Office, 94th Congress,
——
1st Session, 1975.
Uppal, J. S. Disguised Unemployment in an Underdeveloped Economy. New York:
Asia Publishing House, 197.3.
Walker, Kenneth R. Planning in Chinese Agriculture: Socialisation and
the’Private Sector, 1956-1962. London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd.,
1965.
Wei, Wou. “Organizational Choice and Economic Efficiency in Agricultural
China (1949-1969).” Indian Journal of Economics. ~ol. 53, Pt. 2,
No. 217, Oct. 1974, pp. 215-229.
Wu, Yuan-li. “The Economics of Mainland China’s Agriculture: Some Aspects
of Measurement, Interpretation, and Evaluation.’tin Buck, Dawson,
and Wu (eds.). Food and Agriculture in Communist China. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966, pp. 73-100.
Wu, Yuan-li. The Economy of Communist China. New york: Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, 1965.
Yudelman, Montague~ Gavan Butler, and Ranadev Banerji. Technological
Change in Agriculture and Employment in Developing Countrfes. Paris:
Development Centre Studies, Employment Series: No. 4, 1971.